World War One was not the first war where railways played a major part. The American Civil War showed military theorists just how easily large numbers of troops, and mountains of materiel, could be moved by rail. About the First World War, however, it could be said that the planned use of railways was actually a precipitate cause of war. It started with three German military theorists and leaders; Von Moltke the Elder, his nephew Helmuth Von Moltke, and Alfred von Schlieffen, author of the plan of attack on France that bears his name.
Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, 1880-1891, was chief of staff of the Prussian Army for thirty years. He was also a railwayman. He was one of the first directors of the Hamburg-Berlin Railway. In 1843 he published an article What Considerations should determine the Choice of the Course of Railways. Moltke planned and led the Prussian Army in the Austro-Prussian War, also known as the German Unification War. Moltke employed all five railway lines running towards the southern frontier with Austria at the same time. In the lead up to the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the preparations to move armies into battle were revised annually to accommodate both the growth in the army, and in the railway system. Not only did railways figure heavily in mobilization plans, but their very construction was influenced by military considerations. From a contemporary account:
A distinct policy of nationalization was not inaugurated until after the 1870 Franco-Prussian War. Bismarck wanted a unified system as a means of binding the empire together politically and strengthening its military position. The conflicts with Austria and France had impressed him with the advantages of such state control as would enable the central government, without intermediaries, to use the railways to convey troops promptly where they would be most effective. The power of the imperial government to regulate all railways, public or private, was broadly defined in the Imperial Constitution. Under Bismarck's influence, a comprehensive plan for uniting the interests of all the German states was inaugurated. He proposed nationalizing all railways throughout the Empire, whether such railways were owned by private corporations or German states. This plan had for its prime object the uniting of all the states in order to establish a powerful, aggressive and harmonious nation. The policy contemplated uniformity of rates, reduction of rates, adjustment of equipment to military needs, and fostering of native industries by giving the Empire control of export and import tariffs.
Much has been written about the Schlieffen Plan and how inflexible and single minded it was in its determination to swing the right flank of the German Army across Belgium and outflank Paris to the west. This emphasis has led to a certain historiographic backlash known as the the Schlieffen Myth:
"The Schlieffen Plan” was the so-called German attack plan supposedly articulated by Count Alfred von Schleiffen, Chief of the German General Staff. It was Germany’s roadmap to war—if all went according to “the Plan,” Germany would deliberately start World War I on their terms in 1916. It called for rapid building of railroads across the country from West to East. The attack would consist of the right wing invading Belgium and swing wide around Paris, striking the city from the West. The left flank would remain stationary at Lorraine and hold off the likely French counterattack. In the eyes of Schlieffen, France would surrender before they let anything happen to Paris. Then, with France out of the war, the German army would utilize their new railroads, move its troops across the country to Eastern front, and knock out Russia. As history “happened,” when entangling alliances ignited the so-called “powder keg,” and launched the War earlier than the Germans had hoped, the Schlieffen plan fell apart. Schlieffen died, and his successor, Ludwig von Moltke not only inherited the Plan, but also altered it, or failed to understand it. Von Moltke moved troops away from the West to bolster the Russian front. “And the rest,” they say, “is history.” From: http://histsociety.blogspot.com/2012/05/was-there-schlieffen-plan.htmlast
Nevertheless, Moltke the Younger developed sophisticated railway deployment timetables for the "swing to the right" and wound up countermanding an order from the Kaiser to modify the westward deployment to concentrate more troops on the Eastern Front against Russia, as Barbara Tuchman's excellent The Guns of August relates:
"Aghast at the thought of his marvelous machinery of mobilization wrenched into reverse, Moltke refused point blank. For the past ten years, first as an assistant to Schlieffen, then as his successor, Moltke's job had been planning for this day, The Day, Der Tag for which all of Germany's energies were gathered, on which the march to final mastery of Europe would begin. It weighed upon him with an oppressive, almost unbearable reponsibility"
Moltke had something of a nervous breakdown in just several months and was replaced on October 25, 1914 by Erich von Falkenhayn. The enormity of the mobilization plans can be seen in another passage by Tuchman:
"One army corps alone out of a total of 40 in the German forces - required 170 railway cars for officers, 965 for infantry, 2,960 for cavalry, 1,915 for artillery and supply wagons, 6,010 in all, grouped in 140 trains, and an equal number again for their supplies. From the moment the order was given, everything was to move at fixed times according to a schedule precise down to the number of train axles that would pass over a given bridge at a given time"
Despite Moltke's protestations, there were, in fact, existing plans to alter the course of the western mobilization to swing east, but these were never put in to effect.
Below are photos and videos of WWI troop trains. Please note that these are from various points of time during the war, but are representative. The inset is a drawing by Hans Baluschek.
Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, 1880-1891, was chief of staff of the Prussian Army for thirty years. He was also a railwayman. He was one of the first directors of the Hamburg-Berlin Railway. In 1843 he published an article What Considerations should determine the Choice of the Course of Railways. Moltke planned and led the Prussian Army in the Austro-Prussian War, also known as the German Unification War. Moltke employed all five railway lines running towards the southern frontier with Austria at the same time. In the lead up to the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the preparations to move armies into battle were revised annually to accommodate both the growth in the army, and in the railway system. Not only did railways figure heavily in mobilization plans, but their very construction was influenced by military considerations. From a contemporary account:
A distinct policy of nationalization was not inaugurated until after the 1870 Franco-Prussian War. Bismarck wanted a unified system as a means of binding the empire together politically and strengthening its military position. The conflicts with Austria and France had impressed him with the advantages of such state control as would enable the central government, without intermediaries, to use the railways to convey troops promptly where they would be most effective. The power of the imperial government to regulate all railways, public or private, was broadly defined in the Imperial Constitution. Under Bismarck's influence, a comprehensive plan for uniting the interests of all the German states was inaugurated. He proposed nationalizing all railways throughout the Empire, whether such railways were owned by private corporations or German states. This plan had for its prime object the uniting of all the states in order to establish a powerful, aggressive and harmonious nation. The policy contemplated uniformity of rates, reduction of rates, adjustment of equipment to military needs, and fostering of native industries by giving the Empire control of export and import tariffs.
Much has been written about the Schlieffen Plan and how inflexible and single minded it was in its determination to swing the right flank of the German Army across Belgium and outflank Paris to the west. This emphasis has led to a certain historiographic backlash known as the the Schlieffen Myth:
"The Schlieffen Plan” was the so-called German attack plan supposedly articulated by Count Alfred von Schleiffen, Chief of the German General Staff. It was Germany’s roadmap to war—if all went according to “the Plan,” Germany would deliberately start World War I on their terms in 1916. It called for rapid building of railroads across the country from West to East. The attack would consist of the right wing invading Belgium and swing wide around Paris, striking the city from the West. The left flank would remain stationary at Lorraine and hold off the likely French counterattack. In the eyes of Schlieffen, France would surrender before they let anything happen to Paris. Then, with France out of the war, the German army would utilize their new railroads, move its troops across the country to Eastern front, and knock out Russia. As history “happened,” when entangling alliances ignited the so-called “powder keg,” and launched the War earlier than the Germans had hoped, the Schlieffen plan fell apart. Schlieffen died, and his successor, Ludwig von Moltke not only inherited the Plan, but also altered it, or failed to understand it. Von Moltke moved troops away from the West to bolster the Russian front. “And the rest,” they say, “is history.” From: http://histsociety.blogspot.com/2012/05/was-there-schlieffen-plan.htmlast
Nevertheless, Moltke the Younger developed sophisticated railway deployment timetables for the "swing to the right" and wound up countermanding an order from the Kaiser to modify the westward deployment to concentrate more troops on the Eastern Front against Russia, as Barbara Tuchman's excellent The Guns of August relates:
"Aghast at the thought of his marvelous machinery of mobilization wrenched into reverse, Moltke refused point blank. For the past ten years, first as an assistant to Schlieffen, then as his successor, Moltke's job had been planning for this day, The Day, Der Tag for which all of Germany's energies were gathered, on which the march to final mastery of Europe would begin. It weighed upon him with an oppressive, almost unbearable reponsibility"
Moltke had something of a nervous breakdown in just several months and was replaced on October 25, 1914 by Erich von Falkenhayn. The enormity of the mobilization plans can be seen in another passage by Tuchman:
"One army corps alone out of a total of 40 in the German forces - required 170 railway cars for officers, 965 for infantry, 2,960 for cavalry, 1,915 for artillery and supply wagons, 6,010 in all, grouped in 140 trains, and an equal number again for their supplies. From the moment the order was given, everything was to move at fixed times according to a schedule precise down to the number of train axles that would pass over a given bridge at a given time"
Despite Moltke's protestations, there were, in fact, existing plans to alter the course of the western mobilization to swing east, but these were never put in to effect.
Below are photos and videos of WWI troop trains. Please note that these are from various points of time during the war, but are representative. The inset is a drawing by Hans Baluschek.
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| Ausflug nach Paris This photo is from the initial German mobilization. |
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| Somewhere on the Eastern Front |
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